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The issue of which instances of religious faith, if any, satisfy these two conditions is beyond the scope of Buchak’s paper. It seems likely to me that
some will, especially ones that have modest propositional objects and that
are expressed by low cost actions. Less likely to pass muster, however, are
instances of great faith, such as having faith that the Christian God exists
and expressing that faith by an act of martyrdom.
It is worth mentioning in closing, if this is not already obvious, that
many of the essays in this volume attempt to address controversial issues
in philosophy of religion by first addressing controversial issues in confirmation theory or formal epistemology or decision theory. In some cases, the
result is that the papers don’t get very far on the actual topics in philosophy
of religion that allegedly motivate them. I don’t mention this as a criticism
of the volume or of any of its essays, but I do hope that some of the talented
authors of these essays regard their work here as initiating a research program in the philosophy of religion instead of terminating one.1

Moral Perception, by Robert Audi. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2013. 194 pages. $35 (cloth).
MICHAEL FUERSTEIN, St. Olaf College
In this relatively compact volume, Robert Audi offers a substantive analytical treatment of moral perception, and situates it within a broader epistemological intuitionism that he has developed elsewhere. Audi’s primary
thesis is that we can perceive moral properties, and that this capacity for
moral perception plays a major role in moral judgment and knowledge.
On Audi’s view, by establishing a capacity for moral perception, he has
also established the possibility of both moral objectivity and the rational
resolution of moral disagreement (4).
The first of the book’s two sections lays out Audi’s conception of moral
perception and the primary arguments in its favor. Audi’s view is that we
perceive moral properties by perceiving their physical “base properties,”
i.e., the physical properties on which moral properties are “consequential”
(39). Thus, when we perceive someone cheating on an exam, we do not directly perceive the moral property of injustice in the way that we directly
perceive, say, the property of roundness. Instead, we perceive injustice in
virtue of having perceived the ordinary physical properties that instantiate
cheating in this case. Audi’s view thus aims to show how moral perception
is possible while avoiding an ambitious form of moral naturalism, i.e., the
view that moral properties are part of the natural order in just the same
way that tables, chairs, and other familiar objects of perception are. Audi
1
I am very grateful to my students, James Elliott, Jonathan Fuqua, and Mark Satta, for
helping me with this review.
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holds that moral properties are “perceptible” without being “perceptual”
(35). Perceptual properties are those like color, shape, and texture, and so
on, which are standard aspects of sense experience. “Perceptible” properties, however, are those that we perceive only through the perceptual base
properties that realize them. Audi thus holds that his view naturalizes
morality in at least one limited sense: we can learn about moral properties
via the natural properties that realize them, natural properties which are
themselves part of the natural causal order (56).
The primary philosophical opponent of Audi’s view is some form of
“intellectualism,” which holds that ostensible instances of moral perception in fact involve either conscious or sub-conscious processes of inference or reasoning (3). On this view, one cannot perceive moral properties.
Instead, one merely perceives events that possess moral properties (without representing the moral properties themselves in perception), and then
makes inferences which result in the attribution of moral properties to the
events one has perceived.
So why should we side with Audi against the intellectualists? Audi’s
core argument is, in effect, that intellectualism about moral phenomena
commits us to implausible views about the perception of various nonmoral phenomena. Audi proceeds here mainly by extrapolating from
examples. When we perceive anger, for example, we do so in virtue of
having perceived the various facial features that are indicative of anger.
But we have indeed perceived anger itself because, Audi suggests, our
attribution of anger is not mediated by some inferential process. Rather,
it is represented in our perceptual experience itself (59). If we deny that
moral perception is possible because moral properties are only perceptible via base properties, then we seem committed to holding that anger
and a wide range of other everyday phenomena are not perceptible either.
Given the importance of this point in the argument, it would have been
helpful to hear something about the empirical side of things. Certainly,
Audi is right that we talk about the perception of anger much in the same
way, indeed, that we talk about “seeing” injustice. But whether or not our
attributions of anger and injustice are mediated by inference seems to be
susceptible of empirical confirmation. This reflects a more general feature
of the book: Audi’s methodological orientation is to operate primarily
within the bounds of a traditional philosophical approach, proceeding
through conceptual argument, careful distinctions, and illustrative examples. Audi’s references are almost exclusively to other philosophers,
and those hoping for significant engagement with empirical psychology
or cognitive science will be disappointed.
The second half of the book situates the account of moral perception
within a more general epistemological framework, focusing in particular
on connections to intuition and emotion. Here, Audi’s discussion is particularly illuminating, unearthing a range of interesting distinctions and
parallels among these three faculties, and showing how they might plausibly serve as the basis for knowledge. It is difficult to do justice to Audi’s
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multi-faceted discussion here, but emotion, perception, and intuition are
united in his view by the way in which they can provide grounds for
knowledge without inferential mediation. Audi holds that the prospect of
moral knowledge without inference has a kind of particularist implication
for moral epistemology (though he does not himself characterize his view
as particularist): some aspects of moral knowledge can be acquired without applying or even believing general moral principles (100). And the
general epistemological framework here is reliabilist: our intuitive, emotional, and perceptual faculties provide justificatory grounds insofar as
they are reliable routes to true belief, even if they operate non-inferentially
(63). Along the way, Audi offers a fascinating discussion of the parallels
between aesthetic and ethical judgment, and also makes a foray into the
substantial epistemological debate about peer disagreement.
Audi does not aim to give knock-down arguments for his views. Instead, the strategy is to make the prospect of moral perception, and moral
knowledge based upon it, seem viable and attractive. Audi makes moral
perception at least a plausible component of our epistemic landscape, in
part because he is careful to qualify his argument at important junctures:
moral knowledge can be but is not always perceptual, perception can be
but is not always propositional, etc. Audi nonetheless makes some very
ambitious claims about the implications of his argument, and the book
would have benefited from further defense and development of these. I
turn now to raising some critical questions about the book.
Recall that, on Audi’s view, moral perception makes possible both
moral objectivity and the rational resolution of moral disagreement. I see
at least two distinct kinds of problems with these claims in the context
of Audi’s argument. The first problem concerns the significance of the
intellectualist/non-intellectualist divide for these matters. Suppose we
imagine an intellectualist who rejects the possibility of moral perception.
She holds that moral knowledge is always gained by applying moral
principles to the observation of non-moral properties, and then drawing
an inference. What advantage is gained—so far as objectivity and rational dispute resolution are concerned—if this extra inferential process is
not required for moral judgment? One possible answer to this question
centers on the general convergence of moral perception across otherwise
heterogeneous moral agents. Perhaps individuals living in rural Somalia
and those living on the Upper West Side of Manhattan might, when confronted with some pointless act of cruelty, both perceive moral wrongness. Perhaps this kind of convergence occurs across a sufficiently broad
range of disparate moral phenomena such that it provides a substantial
basis for rational dispute resolution. Audi sometimes seems to suggest
this sort of point, as when he speculates, for example, that one might have
an unavoidable intuition “that someone is doing a wrong if one sees the
person drop wet banana peels at the top of a stone staircase in a public
square” (99).
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But even if we suppose that we are prone to these sorts of immediate
and compelling judgments, why does it matter whether the judgments
are derived from some inferential process? Prima facie, it seems just as
likely that we would be compelled to draw certain kinds of sub-conscious
inferences as it is that we would be compelled to believe certain things
without such inferences. What is the significant disadvantage of intellectualism here?
A second and related problem concerning Audi’s claims about the relationship between moral perception and moral objectivity/rational dispute
resolution is that Audi doesn’t give any compelling evidence that moral
perception is in fact a reliable or convergent faculty. There is no need
to rehearse here familiar worries about cross-cultural (and even intracultural) divergence regarding moral judgments, and Audi himself does
not deny the validity of these concerns. In a lengthy discussion on peer
disagreement, Audi aims to show that moral disagreement can at least
plausibly be explained by reference to rational differences among disputants (69–82). But that does not suffice to show that moral perception is
likely to help us resolve our disagreements, particularly if the content of
moral perception is thoroughly penetrated by moral background beliefs.
Perception serves as an objective source of knowledge in the case of the
physical world because at least some aspects of our perceptions of the
physical world are relatively stable across diverse theoretical presuppositions. There are at least very significant doubts about this in the moral case,
and Audi doesn’t offer a substantial argument to diminish the credence of
such doubts.
A related problem is that, even if our moral perceptions were stable
across diverse background beliefs, we might simply be in the grips of
a common delusion, as in the case of widespread convergence on racist, sexist, and anti-homosexual beliefs at various points in history. Does
moral perception provide an independent source of evidence with which
to check our moral beliefs? Or does it merely tend to flatter whatever our
preconceptions happen to be? It is certainly possible that moral perception
might serve as a kind of epistemic counterweight to our moral preconceptions, and Audi’s argument goes a long way in articulating the nuances
of such a possibility. But he does not offer much evidence to make this
possibility seem probable. Nor does he venture any specific account of the
conditions that tend to support perceptual reliability in the moral case.
Though the book’s arguments at some points do not go as far as one
might hope, it nonetheless offers a richly nuanced picture of an important
epistemological phenomenon. It also succeeds in connecting that phenomenon in compelling and creative ways to important views on the epistemic status of intuitions and the emotions. It is written with characteristic
analytical care and is full of illuminating examples. I strongly recommend
this volume to anyone interested in these issues and in moral epistemology more generally.

